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1 Introduction
A country may consider a reform that would strengthen the financial sector. Would
this help economic growth and development? This basic question is frustratingly hard
to answer using empirical data because economic development itself spawns financial
development, so while economic and financial developments are positively correlated
this does not answer the question asked. In a highly influential paper, Rajan and
Zingales (1998) provide convincing evidence that financial development is important for
economic development by examining if industrial sectors that are more dependent on
external finance grow relatively faster in countries with a high level of development.
This question involves interactions between financial development and dependency on
external finance. Since the publication of Rajan and Zingales’ study, the estimation of
models with interaction effects have become common in applied economics.
Many articles applying interaction terms are motivated in an intuitive fashion, similar
to the story we just outlined, which makes robustness analysis particularly important.
Robustness analysis with respect to variables included besides the main variable(s) of
interest is now routinely performed in most empirical articles. However, it is our view
that robustness analysis with respect to the functional form should be standard when
one uses non-linear specifications, in particular those involving interactions which we
focus on here.1 This article discusses the case where the true specification, which we
will also refer to as the true Data Generating Process (DGP), is not precisely known.
If the DGP is not pinned down by theory, the standard linear specification can be
seen as a first order Taylor series expansion. If one wants to examine the role of, say, x∗z
in a relation y = f(x, z), then we argue that it is reasonable to examine if the interaction
term may be picking up other left-out components in the second order expansion of f .
Further, we believe that it is often informative to consider the interaction of, say, x and
z after these have been transformed to be orthogonal to other variables. For example, if
1In the case where the specification of the empirical model is tightly pinned down by theory, “ro-
bustness analysis” is rather a test of the underlying theory.
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z is, say, financial openness, and one is interested in how financial openness affects the
impact of x on y one would include x ∗ z. But z may be correlated with other variables
and including linear terms of those will not prevent x ∗ z from spuriously picking up the
effect of the interaction of some of those variables with x. However, if one orthogonalizes
z to other variables, this will not happen. This is, of course, what Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) does automatically in a linear regression but in non-linear specifications
the researcher needs to explicitly consider this. In our experience, this form of robustness
analysis is rarely performed and this article calls for this to become as standard as other
typical robustness checks. We further point out a few issues of interpretation and very
briefly discuss the choice of instruments when interaction terms are included.
We replicate parts of five influential articles, starting with Rajan and Zingales (1998),
checking if their results are robust. The second paper is also written by Rajan and
Zingales (2003) who examined if the number of listed firms in a country is affected by
openness and the historical (1913) level of industrialization. The third article, by Castro,
Clementi, and MacDonald (2004), hypothesizes that strengthening of property rights is
beneficial for growth and more so when restrictions on capital transactions (capital
flows) are weaker. The fourth article, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), examines if
bank valuations (relative to book values) are higher where owners have stronger rights.
The fifth and last replication examines Spilimbergo (2009) who studies if countries that
send a large number of students abroad have better democracies. We find that most
of these papers, if not Spilimbergo’s, are robust to our suggested robustness tests and,
for several of these, some of our alternative specifications strengthen the authors’ cases.
The specification from the Spilimbergo article which we examine is one of many that he
employs and our results are better seen as illustrating our suggestions than as a serious
criticism of his conclusions.
In Section 2, we discuss some practical issues related to the specification of regressions
with interaction effects, illustrate our recommendations with Monte Carlo simulations,
and make recommendations for practitioners. In Section 3, we revisit some prominent
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applied papers where interaction effects figure prominently, including Rajan and Zingales
(1998), and examine if the published results are robust. Section 4 concludes.
2 Linear Regression with Interaction Effects
Many econometric issues related to models with interaction effects are very simple and
we illustrate our discussion OLS estimation. Often applied papers use more complicated
methods involving, say, Generalized Method of Moments, clustered standards errors,
etc., but the points we are making typically carry over to such settings with little mod-
ification.
Let Y be a dependent variable, such as growth of an industrial sector, and X1 and
X2 independent variables that may impact on growth, such as the dependency on exter-
nal finance and financial development. Applied econometricians have typically allowed
for interaction effects between two independent variables, X1 and X2 by estimating a
multiple regression model of the form:
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 +  , (1)
where X1X2 refers to a variable calculated as the simple observation-by-observation
product of X1 and X2. In the example of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the interest centers
around the coefficient β3—a significant positive coefficient implies that sectors that are
more dependent on external finance grow faster following financial development. We
refer to the independent terms X1 and X2 as “main terms” and the product of the main
terms, X1X2, as the “interaction term.” This brings us to our first basic observations.
2.1 Interpreting the t-statistics on the main terms
1. The partial derivative of Y with respect to X1 is β1 + β3X2. The interpretation
of β1 is the partial derivative of Y with respect to X1 when X2 = 0. A t-test for
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β1 = 0 is, therefore, a test of the null of no effect of X1 when X2 = 0. To test for
no effect of X1 one needs to test if (β1, β3) = (0, 0) using, for example, an F-test.
In applied papers, the non-interacted regression
Y = λ0 + λ1X1 + λ2X2 + υ, (2)
is often estimated before the interacted regression. In this regression, λ1 = ∂Y/∂X1 is
the partial derivative of Y with respect to X1, implicitly evaluated at X2 = X2 (the
mean value of X2).
2 The estimated β1-coefficient in (1) is typically close to λˆ1 − βˆ3X2.
2. Estimating the interacted regression in the form
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) +  , (3)
results in the exact same fit as equation (1) and the exact same coefficient βˆ3 and
is nothing but a renormalization. βˆ1 will typically be close to λˆ1 estimated from
equation (2) because β1 = ∂Y/∂X1 is the partial derivative of Y with respect to
X1, evaluated at X2 = X2. If a researcher reports results from (2) and wants to
keep the interpretation of the coefficient to the main terms similar, it is usually
preferable to report results of the regression (3) with demeaned interaction terms
even if it is the same statistical model in a different parameterization.3
2Some social scientists suggest that the interaction term undermines the interpretation of the re-
gression coefficients associated with X1 and X2 (e.g., Allison (1977), Althauser (1971), Smith and
Sasaki (1979), and Braumoeller (2004)). The point is simply that researchers sometimes do not notice
the change in the interpretation of the coefficient estimate for the main terms when the interaction term
is added.
3Because β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3(X1 −X1)(X2 −X2) = (β0 + β3X1X2) + (β1 − β3X2)X1 + (β2 −
β3X1)X2 + β3X1X2, we get the same fit, with the changes in the estimated parameters given from
the correspondence between the left- and right-hand side of this equality. E.g., λˆ0 will be equal to
βˆ0 + βˆ3X1X2 .
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2.1.1 Monte Carlo simulation
We first illustrate how the specification of the interaction term affects the interpretation
of the main terms, although we are not the first to make this point. We generate a
dependent variable, Y , as Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1X2 + , where X1 = 1 + 1 and
X2 = 1+ 2, i ∼ N(0, 1), for all i, and  ∼ N(0, 100). We estimate model (2) without
an interaction term (that model is misspecified) because it is often natural to start by
estimating equation (2) when it is not priori obvious if an interaction effect should be
included. Next, we allow for an interaction term that is either demeaned or not. The
latter specifications are both correctly specified. In column (1) of Table 1, the results
for the model without an interaction term are presented and, in columns (2) and (3),
the correctly specified model is estimated. In column (2), we see how the coefficient to
X1 changes from about 11 to about 3 when the regressors are not demeaned before they
are interacted—a change is close to the predicted size of β3E{X2}. The large change
in the coefficient to the main term is not due to misspecification but it reflects that the
coefficient to X1 is to be interpreted as the marginal effect of X1 when X2 is zero. In
column (3), we estimate model (3) where the terms in the interaction are demeaned and
the coefficient to the interaction term is unchanged from column (2) while the coefficients
of main terms are very close to the ones in column (1)—with the same interpretation.
2.2 A simple observation on IV estimation
3. In the case where, say, X2 is endogenous, X1 is exogenous, and Z is a valid instru-
ment for X2, X1Z will be a valid instrument for X1X2.
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2.3 Robustness to misspecification
If one considers second order terms, a more general specification that one may want to
consider for robustness, is the full second order expansion
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) + β4X21 + β5X22 +  . (4)
(We will refer to X2i ; i = 1, 2 as “second-order terms”—in applications one may wish to
enter the second-order terms in a demeaned forms for the same reasons as discussed for
the interaction term but for notational brevity we use the simpler non-demeaned form
here.) The relevance of this observation is as follows.
4. In a regression with interaction terms, the main terms should always be included
unless excluded by economic theory. Otherwise, the interaction effect may be
significant due to left-out variable bias. (X1X2 is by construction likely to be
correlated with the main terms.)4
5. If Y = f(X1, X2) can be approximated by the second order expansion (4) with
a non-zero coefficient to either X21 or X
2
2 and corr(X1, X2) 6= 0, the coefficient
β3 in the interacted regression (1) may be spuriously significant. For example,
if corr(X1, X2) > 0, the estimated coefficient βˆ3 will usually be positive even
if β3 = 0. If quadratic terms are not otherwise ruled out, we recommend also
estimating the specification (4) in order to verify that a purported interaction
term is not spuriously capturing left-out squared terms.
The potential bias from leaving out second order terms is easily understood. If X1
and X2 are (positively) correlated, we can write X2 = αX1 +w (where α is positive) so
4Some authors have referred to this as a multicollinearity problem. Althauser (1971) shows that the
main terms and the interaction term in equation (1) are correlated. These correlations are affected in
part by the size and the difference in the sample means of X1 and X2. Smith and Sasaki (1979) also
argue that the inclusion of the interaction term might cause a multicollinearity problem. In our view,
collinearity is not a particular problem for regressions with interaction effects—as elsewhere in empirical
economics correlations between regressors make for fragile inference if one asks too much from a small
sample.
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the interaction term (we suppress the mean for simplicity) becomes αX21 + X1w where
the latter term has mean zero and will be part of the error in the regression. If X21 is
part of the correctly specified regression with coefficient δ, the estimated coefficient to
the interaction term when estimating equation (1) will be α δ.
2.3.1 Monte Carlo simulation
In Table 2, the true model does not include an interaction term; instead it is nonlinear
in one of the main terms. We simulate Y = X1 + X
2
1 +  where X1 = 1 + 1 and
X2 = 1 + X1 + 2, i ∼ N(0, 1) for all i. When corr(X1, X2) 6= 0, as in this example,
the interaction term might pick up a left-out variable effect. In column (1), we show
the correct specification. In column (2), we estimate the interaction model and observe
that the interaction term is highly significant. Our suggestion is to include the squares
of both main terms together with the interaction term in order to hedge against such
spurious inference. We report this specification in column (3). This model is correctly
specified, albeit overspecified with some regressors having true coefficients of zero and
we get the correct result.
2.4 Panel data
Consider a panel data regression with left-hand side variable Yit where i typically is a
cross-sectional index, such as an individual or a country (we will use the term country,
for brevity), and t a time index. For a generic panel data variable Xit, Denote the
average over time for cross-sectional unit i by X i. (i.e.,
1
T
ΣTt=1Xit), the average across
cross-sectional units at period t by X .t, and the mean across all observations by X ...
A researcher may estimate the regression
Yit = µi + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3(X1it −X1..) (X2it −X2..) + it , (5)
where µi are country-fixed effects.
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The regression (5) is not robust to squared terms as in the case of OLS, but in
the panel data case, this regression is also not robust to slopes that vary across, say,
countries. If the correct specification is, say,
Yit = µi + β1X1it + β2iX2it + it , (6)
then, if the mean of X1 varies by country and the covariance of X1i. and β2i is non-
zero, the covariance of (X1it −X1..) (X2it −X2..) and β2iX2it becomes non-zero and the
interaction term will pick up the country-varying slopes.
6. In order to hedge against the interacted regression (5) spuriously capturing country-
varying slopes, we suggest that panel data regressions are estimated as
Yit = µi + β1X1it + β2X2it + β3(X1it −X1i.) (X2it −X2i.) + it ,
where the country-specific means are subtracted from each variable in the interac-
tion. Of course, if the time-series dimension of the data is large, one may directly
allow for country-varying slopes. This specification is suggested, in particular, in
datasets where one may expect heterogeneity across the cross-sectional observa-
tions. Alternatively, this specification provides a useful robustness test. (Similar
considerations might be applied to heterogeneity across time periods.)
Note that the panel data regression Yit = µi + β1X1it + β2X2it + it is equivalent to
the regression Yit = β1(X1it−X1i.)+β2(X2it−X2i.) + it , and, indeed, that is how most
software packages perform the estimation since this avoids having a large dimensional
regressor matrix in case the cross-sectional or time dimension is large. This follows
from the fact that a regression on a country dummy is equivalent to subtracting the
country-specific average and an application of the Frisch-Waugh theorem.5
5Frisch-Waugh (1933) theorem: Consider an equation Y = X1β1 +X2β2 +  where β1 is k1 × 1, β2
is k2 × 1. The estimated coefficients to X1 from an OLS regression of Y on X1 and X2 are identical
to the set of coefficients obtained when the residuals from regressing Y on X2 is regressed on the
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2.4.1 Monte Carlo simulations: Panel data with varying slopes
We consider a panel data regression with two “countries” i = 1, 2 for T = 500 “years.”
The true model has the slope forX2 varying across countries: Yit = αi+X1it+ξi X2it+it.
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In Table 3, column (1) shows the results of estimating model (5). We find a spuriously
significant coefficient to the interaction term and a coefficient to X2 which is similar to
the average of the true country-varying slopes. The variable X1 has a lower mean for
country 2 and, because the slope of X2 is larger for country 2, the least squares algorithm
can minimize the squared errors by assigning a negative coefficient to the interaction
term. In the true model, ∂Yit/∂X2 = ξi while in the estimated model ∂Yit/∂X2 =
β2 + β3(X1it − X1..). If the average over t of (X1it − X1..) varies with i, this term will
be correlated with ξi and the regression will likely result in a non-zero β3 coefficient.
In the second column, we illustrate how the subtraction of country-specific means from
each variable prevents the interaction term from becoming spuriously significant due to
country-varying slopes.
2.5 Orthogonalizing the Regressors
In a situation where the regression of interest utilizes a large number of regressors, the
estimated interaction term may capture all sorts of interactions between the variables.
In this situation, one might ascertain that a regression with interactions captures only
interactions between innovations to the variables of interest by orthogonalizing the vari-
ables using the Frisch-Waugh theorem. Consider equation (1). If we want to find the
effect of X1 on ∂Y/∂X2 and we want to ascertain that we are not picking up any other









(Xψ1 = M2X1, Y
ψ = M2 Y, M2 = [I − PX2 ] (M2 is the residual maker from regressing X1 on X2),




. This method is called “netting out” (or partialing out) the effect of X2.
Because we remove the linear effects of X2, the cleaned variables Y ψ and X
ψ
1 are uncorrelated with
(“orthogonal to”) X2.
6We set X11t = 1 + 1t and X21t = 1 + X11t + 2t for the first country, X12t = 1/4 + 3t and
X22t = 1 + X12t + 4t for the second country where it ∼ N(0, 1) for all i. We allow the slope of X2
to vary by country by setting ξ1 = 1 and ξ2 = 2.
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interaction or square term, we can interact X2 with the Frisch-Waugh residual.
Case 1: If the concern is how the variable X1, cleaned of any other regressors, affects
the impact of X2 on Y—or robustness with respect to this—we suggest running the
following regression model:
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X
ψ
1 (X2 −X2) + β4Z +  , (7)
where Z is a third regressor (or vector of regressors), Xψ1 = M2X1 and M2 is the residual
maker (from regressing X1 on a constant, X2, and Z). X
ψ
1 is X1 orthogonalized with
respect to the other regressors.
If α0 + α1X2 + α2Z is the projection of X1 on the other regressors, then X1X2 =
Xψ1 X2 + (α0 + α1X2 + α2Z) ∗X2, which clearly illustrates how an effect of, say, ZX2 on
Y could make X1X2 significant in the case where α2 6= 0. Alternatively, the researcher
could include X22 and Z ∗ X2 in the regression; however, orthogonalization may be
more convenient if the number of regressors is large relative to the sample size. Of
course, it may be that the DGP is such that X1X2 belongs in the regression, rather than
Xψ1 X2. In either event, this robustness test can alert the econometrician to potential
misspecification.
Notice that this generalizes the subtraction of the average and “country-specific”
averages from regressors discussed previously. This procedure may not result in an un-
biased coefficient to the interaction if it is truly the interaction of the non-orthogonalized
X1 and X2 that affects Y ; however, if the interaction involving orthogonalized terms is
significant, it makes it less likely that the interaction is spurious. In either event, this
robustness exercise may help the researcher obtain a better understanding of the data.
Case 2: If one wants to ascertain that the interaction of X1 and X2 captures no other
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regressors, a simple robustness check is to run the following regression model:




2 +  , (8)
where Xψ1 = M2X1 and X
ψ
2 = M1X2, M1 = [I − Pβ0,X1 ] and M2 = [I − Pβ0,X2 ] (M1
is the residual maker from regressing X2 on a constant and X1 and M2 is the residual
maker from regressing X1 on a constant and X2). In the case of other regressors in the
specification, we suggest taking the residuals from a regression of all regressors. This
specification does not deliver a consistent estimate for the coefficient to the interaction
term if the DGP actually involves X1∗X2, but may alert the econometrician to potential
problems if the specification is not tightly pinned down by theory.
2.6 Monte Carlo simulations: Frisch-Waugh orthogonalization
In Table 4, we simulate a model with an interaction term and correlated regressors and
estimate various specifications and robustness regressions as suggested above. The first
columns show the linear regression and a regression involving the demeaned interaction
and quadratic terms. Of more interest is column (3), which uses the interaction of Frisch-
Waugh orthogonalized terms. Orthogonalizing either X1 or X2, but not both, results in
consistent estimates in this case. In column (6), using the interaction of orthogonalized
terms, results in the quadratic terms in X1 and X2 being significant. Orthogonalizing
either X1 or X2 leads to a consistent estimate for the interaction and non-zero quadratic
terms for X2 and X1, respectively. A researcher doing a specification search will conclude
that an interaction term belongs in the model but would need theoretical consideration
to decide if quadratic terms should be included in a “best” specification.
Table 5 is an example where there is a significant interaction between X1 and X2 but
the data generating process involves an interaction between X1 and the component of
X2 that is orthogonal to X1. In non-structural applications, it is often not obvious that
whether the derivative of Y with respect to X1 is a function of some X2 or some variable
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which is correlated with X2. For example, if the effect of credit varies by industry, it may
not be “industry” (the type of product made) that matters but the correlation of indus-
try dummies with financial structure. In the example here, the regressions where X2 is
Frisch-Waugh orthogonalized deliver consistent estimates while the regular interaction,
still significant, does not—neither does the specification with both terms orthogonal-
ized. The specification in column (5) is the true model. An investigator searching for
specifications would notice the high t-value for the interaction term in this specification.
The quadratic term in X2 in column (7) is also highly significant so an investigator
would need to invoke theoretical considerations to choose between specifications—our
suggested robustness tests do not substitute for this. They do, however, flag potential
issues which the practice of reporting only a regression with X1, X2, and X1 ∗X2 does
not.
Table 6 simulates a model with a data generating process which is quadratic in X1
while X1 and X2 are correlated. In this case, the interaction term will be spuriously
significant unless quadratic terms are included or X2, or both independent variables,
have been orthogonalized. Our suggestion is to include quadratic terms but if this
impractical, maybe due to a large number of regressors, the orthogonalized regressions
may be substitutes.
3 Replications
We replicate five influential papers and examine if their implementation of interaction
effects are robust. (Data details are given in the appendix.) First, in Table 7, we ex-
amine if the results of Rajan and Zingales (1998) are robust. The conclusion of this
paper, which has by early 2010 has almost 2500 references, is that accounting standards
matters—in particular in industries that are highly dependent on finance. Considering
the influence of the paper, it is important to examine if the results are robust. The
interactions of interest are between sectors’ external financial dependence (E) and the
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country-level indicators of finance availability: the ratio of (total equity market capital-
ization plus domestic credit) to GDP (T ) and accounting standards (A). We examine if
the results are robust to using Frisch-Waugh residuals for total capitalization (T ) and
accounting standards (A). We find that using Frisch-Waugh residuals in the interaction
term strengthens the size and significance of the interactions; in fact, the interaction of
external dependence and equity market capitalization and credit turns from insignificant
to clearly significant at the 5-percent level with the expected sign. Our robustness exer-
cise makes the original claims of Rajan and Zingales (1998) empirically more convincing.
We also briefly consider the results of Rajan and Zingales (2003), who examined if the
number of listed firms in a country is affected by openness (O), the historical (1913) level
of industrialization (I), and the interaction of openness and historical industrialization.
From Table 8, we see that the t-statistics on the main terms are very much affected by the
interaction terms not being centered although this only involves a different interpretation
of the t-statistics which are positive and significant when the variables are centered in
the interaction. The impact of the interaction term is very robust to including quadratic
terms in the main variables or orthogonalizing the regressors (indicating that these were
likely to be near-orthogonal to begin with). Overall, the conclusions of Rajan and
Zingales (2003) are robust to the potential misspecifications that we suggest examining.
Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) hypothesize that stronger property rights,
as measured by laws mandating “one share-one vote,” “anti-director rights” (which
limit the power of directors to extract surplus), “creditor rights,” and “rule of law,” are
beneficial for growth and more so when restrictions on capital transactions (capital flows)
are weaker. They examine this by including interaction terms between the property
rights indices and capital restrictions. Table 9 replicates Table 1 of their paper. We do
not display regressions with centered interactions because the interaction terms are the
variables of interest (the coefficients to the main terms are not shown). In column (2),
quadratic terms for the property rights measures are included but this strengthens the
authors’ main result of negative interactions. In column (3), we include a quadratic term
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in log GDP, which weakens the significance of the parameters of interest below standard
significance but we do not further explore this issue which is not at the focus of this
article.7 If we use Frisch-Waugh residuals for either the creditor rights measures or the
capital restrictions measure, we again find that the estimated interactions are mainly
negative. Overall, the point estimates in the Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004)
study are not all robust, as one might conjecture from the size of the t-statistics, but
the overall message of their regressions appears robust to the kind of robustness checks
we recommend.
Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) examine if bank valuations (relative to book
values) are higher where owners have stronger rights (Rights), as measured by an anti-
director index, and whether this result is stronger when a larger share of cash flows (CF )
accrues to the owners. The first column of Table 10 replicates Table 5, column (1) of
Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007). Column (2) includes quadratic terms and centers
the variables before interacting. The very large t-statistic found for the main term,
“rights,” in column (1) turns insignificant and both main variables change signs. The
non-centered implementation of Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), in our opinion, gives
a potentially misleading impression of the effect of the main terms; for example, the t-
statistic of “rights” in column (1) implies that there is large significant effect of ownership
rights on valuation when owners’ cash-flow share is nil. But a cash-flow share of nil is
meaningless. Better news for the published paper is that the interaction terms, which
are the authors’ main focus, clearly are estimated robustly.
Finally, in Table 11, we explore a specific set of results from Spilimbergo (2009), that
the interaction of “students abroad” with “democracy in host country” has a negative
effect on the Polity2 measure of democracy.8 This is a panel-data analysis (country by
7The dateset used Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) is fairly small—45 observations—and
some non-robustness must be expected. A fair discussion of the validity of their results would involve
a much longer discussion.
8We choose this article because it is an example of panel data regression for which the data are easily
available; however, the results we replicate are just one of a set of estimations in Spilimbergo’s (2009)
article so the discussion here should be seen as an example rather than an examination of the central
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time) with both time- and country-fixed effects which implies that the coefficients to
the main terms, are determined by these variable after country and time means have
been subtracted. We ask if the results are robust to potentially country-varying slopes
to the main terms by removing country-specific averages before interacting. The first
column shows the results reported in Spilimbergo (2009) while the second column repli-
cates the analysis using the data posted by Spilimbergo on the web site of the American
Economic Review—we need to display both, in order to ascertain that any deviation
between our results and the results in the American Economic Review is not due the
discrepancy between the posted data and the data actually used by Spilimbergo. The
results are similar for those columns, except the R-square is much higher using the
posted data. In column (3), we show the results using interactions that are demeaned
country-by-country. The results are clearly not robust to this alternative specification—
the coefficient to (non-interacted) “students abroad” becomes insignificant while the
coefficient to the interaction changes from significantly negative to (nearly significantly)
positive. Within the setting of our paper, it will take us too far afield to discuss in de-
tail whether country-varying slopes in this setting is a reasonable alternative empirical
specification for Spilimbergo’s study, although it does not seem far fetched that growth
of, say, democracy, varies across countries. Our main point is that, in general, in panel
studies using data from heterogenous cross-sectional units, it may be a reasonable alter-
native (unless ruled out by theory) and it will often be reasonable to examine robustness
against this alternative.
4 Conclusions
We provide practical advice regarding interpretation and robustness of models with
interaction terms for econometric practitioners—in particular, we suggest some simple
rules-of-thumb intended to minimize the risk of estimated interaction terms spuriously
message of Spilimbergo’s paper.
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capturing other features of the data. The main tenet of our results is that researchers
applying interaction terms should be careful with specification and interpretation and
not just put X1X2 into a regression equation without considering robustness of results
to functional form.
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Appendix—Notes on data collection
Rajan and Zingales (1998):
The data are downloaded from Luigi Zingales’ home page. The dependent variable
is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each ISIC industry in each
country for the period 1980–1990. External dependence (E) is the fraction of capital
expenditures not financed with internal funds for firms in the United States in the same
industry between 1980 and 1990. Total capitalization (T ) is the ratio of (equity market
capitalization plus domestic credit) to GDP. Accounting standards (A) is a country-level
index developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research ranking
the amount of disclosure in annual company reports. I is industry’s share of total value
added in manufacturing in 1980 from the United Nations Statistics. For more details on
data sources, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Rajan and Zingales (2003):
We collected the data using the sources given in Rajan and Zingales (2003). The
dependent variable, number of companies to population, is the ratio of the number of
domestic companies whose equity is publicly traded in a domestic stock exchange to
population in millions in 1993 (it is used as an indicator of the importance of equity
markets). As a first source, stock exchange handbooks are used to count the number
of companies and the Bulletin of the International Institute of Statistics is used as a
second source. The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.
GDP is Gross Domestic Product in 1913 obtained from International Historical
Statistics (Mitchell, 1995). We could not find this series for Russia and we used fig-
ure 2 in Rajan and Zingales (2003) to interpolate the data. Openness (O) is the sum
of exports and imports of goods in 1913 divided by GDP in 1913. Exports and imports
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are from the Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations.9 For Brazil and Russia, we
could not find export and import data and we interpolated them from the averages of
the variables in Rajan and Zingales (2003)’s Table 6.
Per capita industrialization (I) is the index of industrialization by country in 1913
as computed by Bairoch (1982). For more details about data sources, see Rajan and
Zingales (2003).
Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004):
We collected the data using the sources given in Castro, Clementi, and MacDon-
ald (2004). The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per
worker 1967-1996. Real GDP per worker is from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1. The
set of countries corresponds to the 49 countries in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998) except we do not have data for Germany, Jordan, Venezuela, Switzer-
land, Zimbabwe, and Taiwan. Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) use four of the
indicators of investor protection introduced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998). The variable CR is an index aggregating different creditor rights in firm
reorganization and liquidation upon default. The indicator antidirector rights (AR) and
the dummy one share-one vote (OV ) are two indices of shareholder rights geared towards
measuring the ability of small shareholders to participate in decision making. Finally,
the index rule of law (RL) proxies for the quality of law enforcement. These variables
are described in more details in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
RCT is a variable created to measure restrictions on capital transactions. First,
a time-series dummy is constructed based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 for
a given country in a given year if the IMF finds evidence of restrictions on payments
on capital transactions for that country-year. Such restrictions include both taxes and
quantity restrictions on the trade of foreign assets. Second, we compute RCT as the
9See http : //www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/leaque/stat.html.
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average of this dummy over the sample period to obtain a measure of the fraction of
time each country imposed restrictions on international capital transactions.
Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007):
The exact data are used in Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) and is downloaded
from Ross Levine’s home-page. It is a new database on bank ownership around the
world, constructed by Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007). Market-to-book is the market
to book value of each bank’s equity of a bank from Bankscope database published in
2003.10 In other words, it is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value
of equity. Loan Growth (LG) is each bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3
years from Bankscope published in 2003.
Rights is an index of anti-director rights for the country from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002). The range for the index is from zero to six
formed by adding the number of times each of the following conditions hold: (1) the
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required
to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting
or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than
or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights
that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting.
CF is the fraction of each bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the controlling
owners. CF values are computed as the product of all the equity stakes along the con-
trol chain. The controlling shareholder may hold cash-flow rights directly (i.e., through
shares registered in his or her name) and indirectly (i.e., through shares held by entities
that, in turn, he or she controls). If there is a control chain, the products of the cash-flow
10Bankscope, maintained by Bureau van Dijk, contains financial and ownership information for about
4,000 major banks.
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rights along the chain are used. To compute the controlling shareholders total cash-flow
rights direct and all indirect cash-flow rights are summed.11 See Caprio, Laeven, and
Levine (2007) for more details on data sources.
Spilimbergo (2009):
The exact data are used in Spilimbergo (2009) and is available from the American
Economic Review’s web site. It is a unique panel data set of foreign students. The
data forms an unbalanced panel comprising five year intervals between 1955 and 2000.
The dependent variable, Polity2, is an index of democracy. StudentsAbroad (S) is the
share of foreign students over population and Democracy in host countries (DH) is the
average democracy index in host countries. See Spilimbergo (2009) for more details on
data sources.
11Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007)’s calculations are based on Bankscope, Worldscope, the Bankers’
Almanac, 20-F filings, and company web sites.
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Table 1: Simulation of Models
Dependent Variable: Y
True model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1X2 + 
(1) (2) (3)
X1 10.989 2.999 10.997
(19.202) (4.72) (24.51)
X2 12.994 4.996 12.991
(22.71) (7.86) (28.97)
X1X2 – 8.000 –
(17.75)
(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) – – 8.000
(17.75)
R2 0.64 0.78 0.78
Notes: The true model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1X2 +  where X1 = 1 + 1 and X2 = 1 + 2,
i ∼ N(0, 1) for i=1, 2 (X1 and X2 are not correlated) and  ∼ N(0, 100). A constant is included but
not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20000. Averages of estimated
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table 2: Simulation of Models: Misspecified Model
Dependent Variable: Y




X1 1.000 3.001 1.000
(12.84) (36.77) (6.98)
X2 – 0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (−0.00)
X21 1.000 – 1.000
(31.38) (15.57)
X22 – – 0.000
(0.00)
(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) – 0.666 0.000
(19.88) (0.00)
R2 0.92 0.86 0.92
Notes: The true model is Y = X1 + X21 +  where X1 = 1 + 1 and X2 = 1 + X1 + 2, i ∼ N(0, 1)
for all i (X1 and X2 are correlated). A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is
500 and the number of simulations is 20000. Averages of estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
24
Table 3: Simulation of Models: PANEL
Dependent Variable: Y






(X1 −X1..) (X2 −X2..) −0.152 –
(−11.01)
(X1 −X1i.) (X2 −X2i.) – −0.000
(−0.02)
R2 0.86 0.85
Notes: The true model is Yit = αi +X1it + ξi X2it + it where X11t = 1 + 1t and X21t = 1 +X11t + 2t
for the first country, X12t = 1/4 + 3t and X22t = 1 + X12t + 4t for the second country where
it ∼ N(0, 1) for all i. X1 and X2 are correlated within each country. We let ξ1 = 1 and ξ2 = 2.
Fixed effects are included in the regressions but not reported. We have i = 1, 2 and t = 1, ..., 500. The
number of simulations is 20000. Averages of estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table 4: Simulation of Models: Frisch-Waugh — A
Dependent Variable: Y
True model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1X2 + 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
X1 18.993 18.999 18.999 19.004 18.993 18.999 18.999 18.999
(17.65) (29.83) (18.30) (19.96) (19.94) (29.83) (29.83) (29.83)
X2 13.006 13.002 13.001 12.998 13.004 13.002 13.002 13.002
(17.10) (28.88) (17.72) (19.31) (19.31) (28.88) (28.88) (28.88)
(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) – 7.994 – – – – – –
(10.17)
(X1 −X1)2 – 0.009 – – – 5.338 0.009 8.006
(0.01) (14.40) (0.01) (17.56)
(X2 −X2)2 – 0.000 – – – 2.664 3.997 0.000
(−0.00) (14.38) (17.54) (−0.00)
Xψ1 X
ψ
2 – – 5.477 – – 5.331 – –
(4.00) (10.17)
Xψ1 (X2 −X2) – – – 8.021 – – 7.994 –
(7.42) (10.17)
(X1 −X1)Xψ2 – – – – 8.045 – – 7.994
(7.45) (10.17)
R2 0.81 0.93 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.93
Notes: The true model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1X2 +  or, equivalently, Y =
19 X1 + 13 X2 + 8 (X1 − X1) (X2 − X2) +  where X1 = 1 + 1 and X2 = 1 + X1 + 2 where
i ∼ N(0, 1) for all i=1,2 (X1 and X2 are correlated), and  ∼ N(0, 100). For columns (3) − (8),
Xψ1 = M2X1 = [I − P[constant,X2]]X1, Xψ2 = M1X2 = [I − P[constant,X1]]X2. A constant is included
but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20000. Averages of estimated
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table 5: Simulation of Models: Frisch-Waugh — B
Dependent Variable: Y
True model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1 2 + 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
X1 −4.998 −4.999 −5.001 −4.998 −4.997 −4.996 −4.996 −4.996
(−6.18) (−6.61) (−6.61) (−6.17) (−7.87) (−7.85) (−7.85) (−7.85)
X2 12.998 12.996 13.001 12.999 12.994 12.994 12.994 12.994
(22.71) (24.32) (24.28) (22.69) (28.92) (28.85) (28.85) (28.85)
(X1 −X1) (X2 −X2) – 2.667 – – – – – –
(8.59)
(X1 −X1)2 – – – – – −2.671 −8.005 −0.001
(−7.23) (−12.46) (−0.04)




2 – – 5.340 – – 5.338 – –
(8.57) (10.17)
Xψ1 (X2 −X2) – – – −0.015 – – 8.005 –
(−0.03) (10.17)
(X1 −X1)Xψ2 – – – – 8.003 – – 8.005
(17.69) (10.17)
R2 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Notes: The true model is Y = 3 X1 + 5 X2 + 8 X1 2 +  where X1 = 1 + 1 and X2 = 1 + X1 + 2
where i ∼ N(0, 1) for all i=1,2 (X1 and X2 are correlated) and  ∼ N(0, 100). For columns
(3) − (8); Xψ1 = M2X1 = [I − P[constant,X2]]X1, Xψ2 = M1X2 = [I − P[constant,X1]]X2. A constant is
included but not reported. The sample size is 500 and the number of simulations is 20000. Averages
of estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table 6: Simulation of Models: Frisch-Waugh — Misspecified Model
Dependent Variable: Y
True model is Y = X1 +X
2
1 + 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
X1 1.000 3.000 3.001 3.001 3.001
(12.84) (36.79) (27.47) (27.47) (27.47)
X2 – 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
X21 1.000 – – – –
(31.40)




2 – – 0.005 – –
(0.05)
Xψ1 (X2 −X2) – – – 1.000 –
(15.70)
(X1 −X1)Xψ2 – – – – 0.001
(0.01)
R2 0.92 0.86 0.75 0.83 0.75
Notes: The true model is Y = X1+X21 + where X1 = 1+1 and X2 = 2+X1+2 where i ∼ N(0, 1)
for all i (X1 and X2 are correlated). For columns (3) − (5); Xψ1 = M2X1 = [I − P[constant,X2]]X1,
Xψ2 = M1X2 = [I − P[constant,X1]]X2. A constant is included but not reported. The sample size is
500 and the number of simulations is 20000. Averages of estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table 7: Replication of Rajan and Zingales (1998): Table 4 (column 5)




E T 0.12 –
(0.82)
E A 1.33 –
(3.74)
(E − E)Tψ – 0.38
(2.40)
(E − E)Aψ – 1.73
(4.38)
R2 0.42 0.42
Notes: The column marked with † replicates Rajan and Zingales (1998). The dependent variable is
the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each ISIC industry in each country for the
period 1980–1990. External dependence, E, is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with
internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry between 1980–1990. For interaction terms, external
dependence is multiplied by financial development variables; total capitalization to GDP ratio (T ) and
accounting standards in a country in 1990 (A). T is the ratio of the sum of equity market capitalization
and domestic credit to GDP (It varies by country). I is industry’s share of total value added in
manufacturing in 1980. The sample size is 1042 for all of the regressions. All regressions include a
constant, country- and industry-fixed effects but their coefficients are not reported. All coefficients are
multiplied by 10. t-statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the
Frisch-Waugh theorem: Tψ = (I − P[constant,I,E,A])T , Aψ = (I − P[constant,I,E,T ])A.
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Table 8: Replication of Rajan and Zingales (2003): Table 7 (Panel B)
Dependent Variable: Number of companies/million population
(1)† (2)† (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I 238.46 −212.00 362.44 318.03 354.22 370.00 347.27
(1.76) (−1.37) (3.49) (0.72) (3.34) (3.46) (3.37)
O 35.36 −0.91 44.17 69.00 41.05 40.65 44.59
(3.86) (−0.08) (6.26) (2.30) (5.86) (5.85) (6.27)
I2 – – – 0.07 – – –
(0.02)
O2 – – – −10.58 – – –
(−0.87)
I O – 919.95 – – – – –
(3.79)
(I − I) (O −O) – – 919.95 743.35 – – –
(3.79) (2.27)
Iψ Oψ – – – – 957.24 – –
(3.61)
Iψ (O −O) – – – – – 950.65 –
(3.64)
(I − I)Oψ – – – – – – 929.71
(3.76)
R2 0.54 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.77
Notes: The column marked with † replicates Rajan and Zingales (2003). The dependent variable is the
number of listed companies per million of population in 1913. Per capita industrialization (I) is the
index of industrialization for that country in 1913. Openness (O) is the sum of exports and imports of
goods divided by GDP in 1913. Coefficient estimates for per capita industrialization and its interaction
with openness are multiplied by 1000. A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. t-
statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the Frisch-Waugh theorem
are Iψ = [I − P[constant,O]] I and Oψ = [I − P[constant,I]]O.
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Table 9: Replication of Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004): Table 1
Dependent Variable: Average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker 1967-1996
(1)† (2) (3) (4)
OV ∗RCT 9.10 −9.94 3.36 – –
(0.60) (−0.57) (0.19)
AR ∗RCT −5.30 −7.29 −5.78 – –
(−1.42) (−1.64) (−1.35)
CR ∗RCT −10.29 −11.14 −3.73 – –
(−2.17) (−2.30) (−0.64)
RL ∗RCT −1.01 1.22 2.51 – –
(−0.34) (0.35) (0.73)
LRGDPW672 – – −9.25 – –
(−2.02)
OV ψ (RCT −RCT ) – – – 15.57 –
(1.02)
ARψ (RCT −RCT ) – – – −6.15 –
(−1.55)
CRψ (RCT −RCT ) – – – −9.38 –
(−1.32)
RLψ (RCT −RCT ) – – – −12.62 –
(−2.06)
(OV −OV )RCTψ – – – – 7.14
(0.40)
(AR−AR)RCTψ – – – – −6.57
(−1.52)
(CR− CR)RCTψ – – – – −14.30
(−2.60)
(RL−RL)RCTψ – – – – −2.91
(−0.91)
Quadratic terms included but not shown N Y Y N N
R2 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.50 0.53
Notes: The column marked with † replicates Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004). RCT
measures restrictions on capital transactions. CR is an index of creditor rights. AR is an in-
dicator of antidirector rights and OV is a dummy for one-share one-vote, OV . LRGDPW67
is the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product per worker in 1967. RL is an index
for rule of law. The coefficients are multiplied by 1000. Main terms of these variables are in-
cluded in all regressions but suppressed. Sample size is 43. A constant is included but not
reported. t-statistics in parentheses. The new variables which are created according to the
Frisch-Waugh theorem are: RCTψ = (I − P[constant,LRGDPW67,OV,AR,CR,RL])RCT , OV ψ = (I −
P[constant,LRGDPW67,RCT,AR,CR,RL])OV , ARψ = (I−P[constant,LRGDPW67,OV,RCT,CR,RL])AR, CRψ =
(I−P[constant,LRGDPW67,OV,AR,RCT,RL])CR, and RLψ = (I−P[constant,LRGDPW67,OV,AR,CR,RCT ])RL.
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Table 10: Replication of Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007): Table 5 (Col-
umn 1)
Dependent Variable: Market-to-book value
(1)† (2) (3) (4)
Loan Growth 0.27 0.64 0.19 0.19
(0.76) (1.42) (0.54) (0.53)
Rights 0.31 −0.22 0.14 0.07
(5.75) (−1.10) (3.43) (1.81)
CF 2.27 −1.57 −0.57 −0.44
(4.33) (−2.98) (−3.23) (−2.35)
Loan Growth 2 0.27 −1.17 – –
(0.76) (−1.44)
Rights 2 – 0.05 – –
(1.51)
CF 2 – 1.34 – –
(2.03)
CF Rights −0.89 – – –
(−5.78)
(CF− CF) (Rights− Rights) – −0.82 – –
(−5.11)
CF ψ (Rights− Rights) – – −0.91 –
(−6.14)
(CF− CF)Rights ψ – – – −0.39
(−4.32)
R2 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.15
Notes: The column marked with † replicates Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007). A constant is included
in all regressions but not reported. Market-to-Book is the market to book value of the bank’s equity
of a bank. Loan Growth (LG) is the bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Rights
is an index of anti-director rights for the country. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow
rights held by the controlling owners. Sample size is 213. t-statistics in parentheses. The new variables
which are created according to the Frisch-Waugh theorem are: CFψ = (I − P[constant,LG,Rights])CF
and Rightsψ = (I − P[constant,LG,CF ])Rights.
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Table 11: Replication of Spilimbergo (2009): Table 2a (Column 2)
Dependent Variable: Polity2 index of democracy
(1)† (2) (3)
Democracyt−5 0.45 0.44 0.44
(9.61) (8.46) (8.44)
Students Abroadt−5 (S) 24.23 24.23 −1.82
(2.81) (2.55) (−0.39)
Democracy in Host Countriest−5 (DH) 0.12 0.12 0.10
(2.23) (2.23) (1.84)
St−5 DHt−5 −33.71 −33.31 –
(−2.71) (−2.47)
(St−5 − St−5i.) (DHt−5 −DHt−5i.) – – 56.44
(1.73)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1107 1121 1121
R2 0.41 0.82 0.82
Notes: The column marked with † replicates Spilimbergo (2009). The data forms an unbalanced
panel comprising five year intervals between 1955 and 2000. The dependent variable, Polity2, is the
composite Polity II democracy index from the Polity IV data set. StudentsAbroad (S) is the share of
foreign students over population and Democracy in Host Countries (DH) is the average democracy
index in host countries. t-statistics in parentheses.
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